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This Article summarizes and discusses important developments in West 
Virginia oil and gas law between July 1, 2015, and June 30, 2016.  This 
Article is divided into two Parts.  The first part will discuss common law 
developments in both State and Federal courts. The second part will discuss 
statutory developments in both enacted and proposed legislation.  
II. Judicial Developments 
Courts in West Virginia have been relatively busy over the last year 
deciding issues related to oil and gas development in the state.  This section 
will first discuss the single oil and gas case decided by West Virginia’s 
highest court.  Next, decisions issued by West Virginia’s federal district 
courts, which have been particularly busy, and a decision by the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals will be discussed and presented in chronological 
order as the decisions were handed down by the courts. 
A. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
In Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Hickman,1 the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, a ruling 
from the Circuit Court of Ohio County that denied a motion to compel 
arbitration and granted lessors’ motion for summary judgment. 
Four siblings (the “Hickmans”) owned a 143 acre tract of land (1/4 each) 
in Ohio County, West Virginia.2  Four different leases signed in 2005, 
2006, January 2011, and in February 2011 were at issue.3  Also relevant to 
the case was a lease signed by the Hickmans in 2001.4  The 2001 lease was 
negotiated by William Capouillez,5 a geologist who operated a company 
that negotiated leases on the behalf of mineral owners.6  Three siblings 
signed the 2001 Lease at the same time, then, the signed leased was mailed 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 781 S.E.2d 198 (W. Va. 2015). 
 2. Id. at 204. 
 3. Id. at 204-08. 
 4. Id. at 204. 
 5. Mr. Capouillez was a defendant in this case. For more about Mr. Capouillez, see 
Geological Assessment & Leasing v. O’ Hara, 780 S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 2015), in which the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered certain issues relating to allegations 
that Mr. Capouillez engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 
 6. Chesapeake Appalachia, 781 S.E.2d at 204. 
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to the forth sibling, Cecil, which he signed.7  Cecil contended this 
established a pattern of dealing with Mr. Capouillez.8 
The first lease (the “2005 Lease”), a lease to Great Lakes Energy 
Partners, LLC (now Range Resources—Appalachia, LLC) (“Range”) was 
only signed by three siblings, not Cecil, even though he was listed as a 
lessor.9  Mr. Capouillez was listed as a “consultant” on the lease and was to 
receive a share of the bonuses and royalties.10  The lease also contained an 
arbitration clause that stated “any controversy or claim arising out of or 
relating to this Lease . . . shall be ascertained and settled by arbitration.”11  
Again, Cecil Hickman never signed this lease. 
The second lease (the “2006 Lease”) was sent to Cecil Hickman by 
Range in 2006 which contained the same extension language and arbitration 
clause as the 2005 Lease.12  Cecil signed both the lease and a memorandum 
of lease, had them acknowledged, and sent them back to Range.13  Cecil 
contended that he never dated the documents and that Range had 
fraudulently filled in the effective date of July 19, 2006.14  Cecil thought he 
was just agreeing to the lease his siblings had signed in 2005.15  To add 
another layer of intrigue, the memorandum of lease incorrectly identified 
the parcel as being in Brooke County, West Virginia,16 where it was filed in 
the county clerk’s office.17  Mr. Capouillez was again listed on the lease as 
a “consultant.”18  This lease, along with the 2005 Lease, was assigned to 
Chesapeake Appalchaia, LLC (“Chesapeake”).19  
The third lease (the “January 2011 Lease”) was between Chesapeake and 
all four siblings!20 However, the lease was not signed by Chesapeake or any 
of its agents.21  Cecil Hickman alleges that an agent of Chesapeake 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 205. 
 11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12. Id. at 206. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Brooke County borders Ohio County to the north in West Virginia’s Northern 
Panhandle. 
 17. Chesapeake Appalachia, 781 S.E.2d at 206. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  
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contacted him the lease was signed to inform him that he was still under 
lease by the 2006 Lease and that none of the siblings would receive the 
promised bonuses of the January 2011 Lease unless they agreed to remove 
Cecil from it.22  This lease contained a clause stating that “Chesapeake 
retains the right to surrender the Lease . . . at any time and for any 
reason.”23 
Lastly, the fourth lease (the “February 2011 Lease”) was a top lease 
signed by Cecil Hickman, which he claims he acquiesced to out of duress 
that his siblings would not receive their bonuses under the January 2011 
Lease.24 Again, the lease was not signed by Chesapeake or any of its 
agents.25  Cecil’s three siblings were paid their bonuses and work began on 
the leased premises that Chesapeake contends was sufficient to constitute “a 
bona fide attempt to secure . . . the production” of oil and gas, thus locking 
in Cecil under the 2006 Lease.26   
Cecil Hickman filed suit, pursuing a number of claims.  First, that he was 
bound by the 2005 Lease as there had been a “meeting of the minds” and 
that this lease had expired when they signed the January 2011 Lease.27  
Second, that Mr. Capouillez was negligent, incompetent, and had breached 
fiduciary duties.28  Third, that Range had fraudulently altered the 2006 
Lease and had published statements derogatory to his title.29  Fourth, 
Chesapeake’s agents fraudulently induced him to sign the February 2011 
Lease.  Lastly, that Chesapeake had breached the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, mishandled leases, published false statements about 
his title, and engaged in the tort of outrage.30 
The trial court ruled that the 2006 Lease (no meeting of the minds) and 
February 2011 (mistakes of fact and misrepresentation) were void, the 2005 
Lease had expired, and that the parties were compelled to arbitrate their 
claims under the January 2011 Lease.31  However, Chesapeake was ordered 
to pay Cecil his bonus under the January 2011 Lease to avoid its failure for 
lack of consideration.32 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. at 207-08. 
 23. Id. at 207. 
 24. Id. at 208. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 209. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 209-10. 
 32. Id. at 210. 
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On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court’s decision that the February 2011 Lease was void and 
unenforceable as it was acquired through mistake of fact and 
misrepresentation.33  The Court also affirmed the decision that Chesapeake 
must pay Cecil his bonus if it wanted to compel arbitration under the 
January 2011 Lease, but disagreed that Chesapeake needed pay Cecil 
royalties because that  would be a question for arbitration.34 However, the 
Court reversed and held that Range and Mr. Capouillez do not have to 
arbitrate under the January 2011 Lease.35  In its holding, the Court found 
five theories under which a signatory to an arbitration agreement can bind a 
non-signatory: “(1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; 
(4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and (5) estoppel.”36  The Court held that Mr. 
Capouillez and Range were not bound by the arbitration agreement in the 
January 2011 Lease because none of these five theories were satisfied.  
Furthermore, the Court also found that the trial court had failed to analyze 
the 2005 Lease and the 2006 Lease under the Federal Arbitration Act and 
must do so on remand.37 
B. Federal Courts 
In Statoil USA Onshore Properties Inc. v. Pine Resources, LLC, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia 
granted Statoil’s motion for summary judgment finding it had no obligation 
to perform drilling requirements contained in a prior agreement.38 
Pine owned a 565-acre parcel in Barbour County, West Virginia.39  In 
2008, Pine sold its mineral rights in the property to PetroEdge, retaining for 
itself an 18% overriding royalty interest.40  Pine and PetroEdge entered into 
a Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA”) requiring that PetroEdge would 
“apply for a meter tap on a gas transmission line within sixty days of 
execution . . ., spud one well within one year after installation of the meter 
tap, and spud three wells (including the first well) within five years after 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 213. 
 34. Id. at 220. 
 35. Id. at 221. 
 36. Id. at 217 (citing Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 
349, 352 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 37. Id. at 222. 
 38. No. 2:14-cv-021169, 2015 WL 5304295, *4 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 9, 2015). 
 39. Id. at *2. 
 40. Id. 
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installation of the meter tap.”41  PetroEdge did not complete any wells on 
the property. 42  In 2012, PetroEdge sold its mineral ownership to Statoil.43 
Statoil filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed no 
obligations to Pine under the PSA.44  Pine counterclaimed, alleging breach 
of contract and sought specific performance.45  Both parties filed motions 
for summary judgment.46 
At issue was the PSA, specifically, the identification of the parties to the 
PSA and the obligations of the “Purchaser.”47  PetroEdge was designated as 
the Purchaser in the PSA.48  Statoil argued that the drilling obligations in 
the PSA only applied to PetroEdge, relying on Section 7.249 of the PSA.50  
Pine argued that Statoil became the “Purchaser” and that Section 8.851 
applied the terms of the PSA to the successors and assigns.52 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *3. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at *2. 
 48. Id. at *6. 
 49. Section 7.2 of the PSA states that  
(a) The representations and warranties of the Parties in Articles 3 (except 
Section 3.7) and 4 and the covenants and agreements of the Parties in Article 6 
(sic ) (except Section 5.4 through 5.9) shall survive the Execution Date for a 
period of two (2) years. The representations, warranties, covenants and 
agreements of Seller in Sections 3.7 and 5.4 shall survive until the close of 
business 30 days after the expiration of the applicable statutes of limitation 
(including any extensions thereof) provided that any proceeding or 
indemnification claim pending on the date of any such termination shall survive 
until the final resolution thereof. The remainder of this Agreement shall survive 
the Execution Date so long as Purchaser holds any interest in the Mineral 
Rights. Representations, warranties, covenants and agreements shall be of no 
further force and effect after the date of their expiration, provided that there 
shall be no termination of any bona fide claim asserted pursuant to this 
Agreement with respect to such a representation, warranty, covenant or 
agreement prior to its expiration date. 
Id. at *2. 
 50. Id. at *6. 
 51. Section 8.8 of the PSA states that 
[a]ny assignment by Seller of all or any part of its rights with respect to the 
Excluded Mineral Rights or any related interests shall be made expressly 
subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, and such assignment not 
in compliance with this Section 8.8 shall be void ab initio. Subject to the 
foregoing, this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the 
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The court granted Statoil’s motion for summary judgment.53  First, the 
court found the PSA language to be clear and unambiguous.54  The specific 
terms of Section 7.2 of the PSA states that the PSA will remain in effect “so 
long as Purchaser holds any interest in the Mineral Rights.”55  PetroEdge 
was specifically identified as the Purchaser.56  Accordingly, only PetroEdge 
was obligated under the PSA.57  Furthermore, Section 8.8 did not modify 
the remainder of the contract.58  Lastly, Statoil was not estopped by 
ratification because “a contract, if ratified at all, must be ratified as a 
whole.”59  Pine has filed an appeal to United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit. 
In SWN Production Co., LLC v. Edge,60 the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of West Virginia granted the oil and gas 
company’s motion for a preliminary injunction so it could enter onto 
defendant’s land to “explore, drill, and develop the area for oil and gas 
operations.”61 
The defendants own the surface of 87.85 acres in Marshall County, West 
Virginia.62  The oil and gas interests were excepted and reserved in the 
conveyance granting the defendants their tract of land.63  At the time of that 
conveyance in 1980, the property was subject to a 1977 lease to Columbia 
Gas Transmission Corporation.64  In 2010, the owners of the oil and gas 
interests leased the property to NPAR, LLC with the “exclusive right to 
explore, drill, develop, and conduct oil and gas operation, plus all other 
rights and privileges that are necessary or land covered hereby.”65  The 
plaintiff acquired the rights to that lease and it was renewed in 2015.66  The 
                                                                                                                 
Parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns. 
Id. at *2. 
 52. Id. at *3. 
 53. Id. at *6. 
 54. Id. at *5. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
 60. No. 5:15CV108, 2015 WL 5786739 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 30, 2015). 
 61. Id. at *1. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at *2.  
 66. Id. 
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plaintiff had permitted and planned to operate a well on the property by 
October 2015. 67  However, in July 2015, the defendants denied the 
plaintiff’s personnel entry onto the property and continued to deny entry.68 
The plaintiff filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction and a declaratory 
judgment of its rights under the lease.69  The defendants alleged that the 
plaintiff did not have the right to enter their property and that it cannot use 
the surface of their property to drill a horizontal well to extract oil and gas 
from neighboring lands.70 
The issue before the court was whether the 1977 and 2010 leases and the 
1980 deed give the plaintiff the express right to use the land as proposed.71  
Specifically, the defendants argued that the reservation in the 1980 deed 
incorporated by reference the 1977 lease and that any reservation in the 
deed expired with that lease.72 However, under West Virginia law, “parties 
may incorporate into their contract the terms of some other writing.”73  The 
reservation in the deed is as follows: 
There is excepted and reserved from this conveyance, however, 
all of the oil and gas, in and underlying said land, together with 
all of the rights to enter upon said land to explore, drill for, 
produce and market all such oil and gas as said rights are set 
forth in the lease from Harold H. Fisher and Dorothy L. Fisher, 
his wife, to Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation, by lease 
dated May 3, 1977, and recorded in the office of the Clerk of the 
County Court of Marshall County, West Virginia, in Deed Book 
460, page 351.74 
The court granted the preliminary injunction finding that the plain 
language of the deed is clear and unambiguous and that the reference to the 
1977 lease in the 1980 deed merely illustrates the scope of the rights 
reserved.75   
In Equitrans, L.P. v. 0.56 Acres More or Less of Permanent Easement 
Located in Marion, County, West Virginia,76 the United States District 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at *1. 
 70. Id. at *2. 
 71. Id. at *4. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at *5. 
 74. Id. at *1. 
 75. Id. 
 76. No. 1:15CV106, 2015 WL 7300548 (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 18, 2015). 
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Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted Equitrans’s 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the counterclaims of vexatious litigation and 
trespass by landowners and denied the landowners’12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss.77  The current suit arose out of a previous suit wherein the 
landowners, the Moores, won a jury trial that found that Equitrans had 
violated a pipeline right-of-way or had trespassed by maintaining a pipeline 
outside of the right-of-way.78  The court stayed an execution of the 
judgment so Equitrans could seek a condemnation of the right-of-way, the 
subject of the current litigation.79  The court found the Moores failed to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that Equitrans’s claims 
were sufficiently plead.80  In K & D Holdings, LLC v. Equitrans, L.P.,81 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a decision by 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia 
that a lessee had abandoned its oil and gas lease. 
K & D Holdings is the lessor and Equitrans is the lessee of oil and gas 
rights to 180 acres in Tyler County.82  Equitrans sublet its rights to EQT to 
produce gas from subsurface formations that are not used for the storage of 
gas or protection of stored gas.83  EQT has not engaged in the exploration 
or storage of oil and gas on the property, but it has engaged in the 
protection of stored gas.84  Part of the property is within a 2,000 foot buffer 
zone established by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to protect 
Equitrans’s nearby Shirley Storage Field.85  The Durational Provision of the 
lease read: 
To have and to hold the said land and privileges for the said 
purposes for and during a period of 5 years from December 2, 
1989, and as long after commencement of operations as said 
land, or any portion thereof or any other land pooled or unitized 
therewith as hereinafter provided, is operated for the exploration 
or production of gas or oil, or as gas or oil is found in paying 
quantities thereon or stored thereunder, or as long as said land is 
used for the storage of gas or the protection of gas storage on 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. at *1. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at *8. 
 81. 812 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 82. Id. at 335. 
 83. Id. at 336. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
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lands in the general vicinity of said land. It is understood that a 
well need not be drilled on the leased premises to permit the 
storage of gas thereunder and the Lessee shall be the sole judge 
of when and if said land is being used for the storage of gas or 
the protection of gas storage on lands in the general vicinity of 
said land.86 
K & D filed a complaint claiming that because EQT has not produced or 
sold gas for a period greater than 24 months the lease had been 
abandoned.87  Acting sua sponte, the district court found that the lease was 
divisible as a matter of law.88  According to the district court, the portion of 
the property being used for protection of stored gas remained under lease 
while the portion that was not used for exploration or production had 
expired.89  The Court of Appeals had no reservation reversing the District 
Court, finding that the plain terms of the Durational Provision prevented 
this lease from being divisible.90  The case was reversed and remanded with 
instructions to enter judgment in favor of the lessees. 
In Leggett v. EQT Production Co.,91 the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of West Virginia certified two  questions to the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.  The questions are: 
1.  Does Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C., 633 
S.E.2d 22 (2006), which was decided after the enactment of 
West Virginia Code § 22-6-8, have any effect upon the Court's 
decision as to whether a lessee of a flat-rate lease, converted 
pursuant to West Virginia Code § 22-6-8, may deduct post-
production expenses from his lessor's royalty, particularly with 
respect to the language of “1/8 at the wellhead” found in West 
Virginia Code § 22-6-8(e)? 
2.  Does West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 prohibit flat-rate royalties 
only for wells drilled or reworked after the statute's enactment 
and modify only royalties paid on a per-well basis where permits 
for new wells or to modify existing wells are sought, or do the 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 337. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 340. 
 91. No. 1:13CV4, 2016 WL 297714 (N.D.W. Va. Jan. 22, 2016). 
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provisions of West Virginia Code § 22-6-8 abrogate flat-rate 
leases in their entirety?92 
In Leggett, the lease in question was a 1906 lease providing for a royalty 
of $300.00 per year per well (a flat-rate royalty).93  West Virginia has a flat-
rate well statute that provides that owners of the oil and gas are to receive 
not less than one eighth of the total amount paid to or received 
by or allowed to the owner of the working interest at the 
wellhead for the oil or gas so extracted, produced or marketed 
before deducting the amount to be paid to or set aside for the 
owner of the oil or gas in place, on all such oil or gas to be 
extracted, produced or marketed from the well.94 
In Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources., LLC,95 the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that “at the wellhead” language 
contained in a lease does not allow the producer to deduct post-production 
expenses from the royalty payment.96 Thus, the lessors claim that their 
royalties were improperly calculated, calling into question what “at the 
wellhead” means within the flat-rate well statute.97 
Of relevance, here, is the breach of contract claim against EQT which the 
court deferred pending answers from the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals.98 
In EQT Production Co. v. Wender,99 the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment in favor 
of EQT, finding that a Fayette County ordinance banning the storage, 
disposal, or use of oil and natural gas waste in the county was preempted by 
state law and thus void.100 
  
                                                                                                                 
 92. See Fout v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:15CV68, 2016 WL 868279 (N.D.W. Va. Mar. 7, 
2016). Fout is very similar, factually, to Leggett. In Fout, plaintiffs’ motions were denied 
without prejudice as the court awaits answers from the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals. Id. 
 93. Leggett, 2016 WL 868279 at *2. 
 94. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6-8(e) (West 2016) (emphasis added). 
 95. 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006). 
 96. Id. at 30. 
 97. Leggett, 2016 WL 868279 at *1. 
 98. Id. at *14. 
 99. No. 16-000290, 2016 WL 3248503 (S.D.W. Va. June 10, 2016). 
100. Id. at *16. 
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III. Statutory Developments 
The Second Session of the Eighty-second Legislature of West Virginia 
was a busy time for our State Senators and Delegates, more so over a 
budget battle, but bills were introduced and passed affecting oil and gas 
development in the state.101  
There was focus on taxes, fees and safety in the oil and gas industry in 
the legislation introduced during the last legislative session.  
Senate Bill 491 terminated an additional severance tax on natural gas.102 
Senate Bill 505 exempted certain uses of field gas from the motor fuel 
excise tax.  Field gas is defined as natural gas “extracted from a production 
well, storage well, gathering system, pipeline, main or transmission line that 
is used as fuel to power field equipment.”103  As long as this gas is not used 
on the public roads and the royalty payments have been made to the mineral 
owners, this gas is exempt from the motor fuel excise tax.104  Senate Bill 
592 amended W. Va. Code §24B-5-3, allowing the Public Service 
Commission to levy a rate of $18.60 per mile of three-inch equivalent 
pipeline as a special license fee.105   
House Bill 4218 revised the definition of “underground facility” relating 
to the One-call system in W. Va. Code § 24C-1-2.  Of relevance, 
“underground facility” means  
any underground pipeline facility, owned by a utility and 
regulated by the Public Service Commission, which is used in 
the transportation or distribution of  gas, oil or a hazardous 
liquid; any underground pipeline facility, owned by a company 
subject to  the jurisdiction of the federal energy regulatory 
commission, which is used in the gathering, transportation or 
distribution of gas, oil or a hazardous liquid; any underground 
production or gathering pipeline for gas, oil, or any hazardous 
substance with a nominal inside diameter in excess of four 
inches and that is not otherwise subject to one-call reporting 
requirements under federal or state law . . . .106 
                                                                                                                 
101. For a complete list of completed legislation in West Virginia, go to 
http://www.legis.state.wv.us.  
102. S. 491, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016) 
103. S. 505, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016). 
104. Id. 
105. S. 592, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016). 
106. H.R. 4218, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016). 
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House Bill 4323 requires pipeline operators and well operators to report 
incidents to the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management at the Mine and Industrial Accident Call Center within fifteen 
minutes of ascertaining the occurrence of an incident at a well, well pad, or 
pipeline facility.  An “incident” is defined as: 
(A) An injury to an individual at a well, well pad or pipeline 
facility that results in death or 5 serious bodily injury or that has 
a reasonable potential to cause death;  
(B) An unintended confinement of an individual in an enclosed 
space at a well, well pad or pipeline facility from which a person 
will not be released for a period exceeding fifteen minutes;  
(C) The unintended ignition or explosion of oil, natural gas or 
other substance at a well, well pad or pipeline facility; 
(D) An unintended fire in or about a well, well pad or pipeline 
facility not extinguished within fifteen minutes of discovery of 
the unintended fire; and  
(E) Any unintended release of poisonous or combustible 
substances that have a reasonable potential to cause death.107 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
107. H.R. 4323, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016). 
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